State of Utah v. Kelly Hansen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
State of Utah v. Kelly Hansen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
Kent O. Willis; Elkins and Willis; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hansen, No. 198621016.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1508
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0/6 





Case No. 21,016 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
ELKINS & WILLIS 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
60 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
.11 IN 319RG 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 21,016 
P r i o r i t y 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
ELKINS & WILLIS 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
60 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL - - - - - - - - - - 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 
ARGUMENT - - - - - - _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - _ - _ 3 
I. EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A SEARCH WARRANT BASED 
ON A DEFECTIVE AFFIDAVIT MUST BE SUPPRESSED - - - - - - 3 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE J1I1ELTO THE LAPSE OF 
TIME BETWEEN THE ALLEGED OBSERVATION OF ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITY AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 4 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT 
INFORMATION FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO 
DETERMINE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED - - - - - - - - - 8 
II. THE SEARCH OF THE LOCKED BOX WAS 
UNREASONABLE AND WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE - - - - - - - - 10 
CONCLUSION - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 12 
ADDENDUM - - _ _ - _ - - - _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ A-l 
Statutes Cited 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment - - - - - - - 3 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 1 4 - - - - - - - - 3 
Authorities Cited 
68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures, Section 70, p.724 - - _ 5 
Cases Cited 
Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 
12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) 8 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 
61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) 11, 12 
Ashley v. State, 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968) - - - - - - - 4, 5 
People v. David, 326 N.W.2d 485 (Mich.App. 1982) - - - - 4, 7 
People v. Siemieniec, 368 Mich. 405, 
118 N.W.2d 430 (Mich. 1962) 6 
People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 
116 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. 1962) 6 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) 8 
U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 
53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) 10, 11, 12 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 21,016 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal presents two related issues arising from the 
trial Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant 
alleges that the Court's ruling was in error on two separate 
grounds. First, that the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant was defective due to the amount of time between the 
alleged observation of illegal activity and the issuance of the 
search warrant and due to the lack of sufficient facts showing 
the informant's reliability. Second, that the search of a locked 
box located in the search of Defendant's residence was without 
probable cause and required a separate search warrant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 16th day of August, 1985, the Defendant was residing 
with Dale Hundley at 1097 North 150 West, Orem, Utah. At 
approximately 10:00 a.m., officers from Orem City entered the 
apartment with a search warrant and began searching the 
apartment. On the floor of Mr. Hundley's room, the officers 
located a metal box locked with a padlock. Officers located a key 
to the locked box in Mr. Hundley's pants pocket, unlocked the 
lock and opened the box. Inside the box, the officers located and 
seized a plastic baggie which allegedly contained marijuana. 
The affidavit which was presented to the magistrate on the 
morning of August 16, 1985, alleged that a confidential informant 
had been in the residence of Dale Hundley on August 11, 1985, and 
had there observed a large quantity of marijuana which was being 
sold in smaller quantities. A copy of the affidavit was attached 
to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress (R. 
26-27) and a copy of the affidavit is attached hereto in the 
Addendum and identified as page A-l. The affidavit further stated 
that the informant had supplied information in the past which had 
resulted in conviction. 
The trial court denied the Motion to Suppress in a Ruling dated 
October 18, 1985 (R. 39). A copy of said Ruling is attached hereto in 
the Addendum and identified as page A-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A SEARCH WARRANT BASED ON A 
DEFECTIVE AFFIDAVIT MUST BE SUPPRESSED. Defendant alleges that 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant in this matter was 
defective and that the evidence obtained as a result of that 
search must be suppressed. 
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A. THE AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE DUE TO THE LAPSE OF TIME 
BETWEEN THE ALLEGED OBSERVATION OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. Although probable cause may have 
existed for issuance of a search warrant on August 11, 1985, 
there was no probable cause on August 16, 1985, to believe that 
evidence of illegal activity would be at the place to be searched 
on August 16, 1985. 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR 
THE MAGISTRATE TO DETERMINE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. The 
information supplied by the confidential informant was not of 
sufficient detail for the magistrate to determine that the 
informant was reliable. There were insufficient facts regarding 
the informants prior reliability to justify a finding of 
probable cause by the magistrate. 
II. THE SEARCH OF THE LOCKED BOX WAS UNREASONABLE AND 
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. The Defendants had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the locked box. The officers should 
have obtained a search warrant for the locked box if there was 
probable cause to believe the box contained contraband. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A SEARCH WARRANT BASED ON A 
DEFECTIVE AFFIDAVIT MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah, protect the 
people against "unreasonable searches and seizures". The 
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Constitution of Utah further provides that "no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized." The required "oath or affirmation" 
generally takes the form of an affidavit by the investigating 
officer. The affidavit must present the facts necessary to give 
the issuing magistrate "probable cause". Probable cause has been 
defined as "facts and circumstances which would warrant a person 
of reasonable prudence to believe that the items sought are in 
the stated place." People v. David, 326 N.W.2d 485 (Mich.App. 
1982). 
It has been widely held that if the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant is defective, the search warrant is defective, and 
the evidence seized thereby must be suppressed. See, for example, 
Ashley v. State, 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968). Defendant in this 
matter alleges that the affidavit is defective for two reasons 
and that the search warrant issued based upon that affidavit is 
likewise defective. 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE DUE TO THE LAPSE OF TIME 
BETWEEN THE ALLEGED OBSERVATION OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant alleges that the affidavit in this case was 
clearly insufficient to give the magistrate probable cause to 
believe that the evidence was currently at the residence of Dale 
Hundley. 
-4-
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that defendant which occurred on October 3, 1964, eight days 
earlier. In holding that the lower court should have suppressed 
the evidence, the Indiana Court stated: 
"Although there can be no precise rule as to how much 
time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts 
and the issuance of the search warrant, in dealing with 
a substance like marihuana, which can be easily 
concealed and moved about, probable cause to believe 
that it was in a certain building on the third of the 
month is not probable cause to believe that it will be 
in the same building eight days later. Therefore, since 
the affidavit only made a showing of probable cause 
existing on October 3, 1964, and not on October 11, 
1964, when the search warrant was issued the search 
warrant was defective and it was error to deny 
appellantsf motions to quash the affidavit for the 
search warrant and to suppress the evidence thereunder 
seized." 241 N.E.2d at 269. 
In the case of People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 116 N.W.2d 
768 (Mich. 1962), an officer signed an affidavit on February 24, 
1961, stating that on February 18, 1961, he had purchased alcohol 
from defendant's establishment and had observed others purchasing 
alcohol and gambling. That Court upheld the lower court's 
suppression of evidence and stated: 
"The right to issue a search warrant rests upon facts 
existing at the time the showing is made for the 
warrant. This is made clear by the Constitution and 
every statutory provision with reference to search 
warrants." 116 N.W.2d at 787-788. 
In a similar Michigan case, People v. Si'emieniec, 368 Mich. 
405, 118 N.W.2d 430 (Mich. 1962), a lapse of four days from the 
time the illegal activity was observed to the date the affidavit 
was signed, was held to invalidate the search warrant. 
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B. THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR 
THE MAGISTRATE TO DETERMINE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. 
In the cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 
1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the United States 
Supreme Court held that an affidavit supporting a search warrant 
could be based on hearsay information from an unnamed informant, 
provided the affiant states a set of facts which allows the 
magistrate to independently judge the accuracy and reliability of 
the informant's hearsay information. 
Those cases established a two-prong test for the reliability 
of an informant's information. Under the first prong, the 
information must be sufficiently detailed so that the magistrate 
can determine whether the information is a product of the 
informant's own personal knowledge. The second prong requires the 
affiant to set forth facts regarding the informant's prior 
reliability sufficient for the magistrate to independently 
determine that the informant is reliable. 
In the present case the information supplied by the 
informant was vague. The affidavit indicates the informant saw 
only a "large quantity of marijuana which was being sold in 
smaller quantities." Without more detailed information, the 
magistrate would be unable to determine if the information was 
correct or merely the product of rumor or conjecture. If the 
informant was actually present as alleged, he should have been 
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able to state the approximate amount of marijuana observed, the 
persons who may have been present, whether he had observed an 
actual sale, whether he had observed the larger quantity being 
divided, and weighed, etc. The information in the affidavit is so 
vague that the informant could have been the only person in the 
apartment with the marijuana and the affidavit would still be 
technically correct. The information in the affidavit was clearly 
insufficient to meet the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test. 
Under the second prong, the affidavit contained the 
officer's conclusory statement that the informant had supplied 
information in the past which had resulted in several arrests and 
convictions. The affidavit does not contain facts upon which the 
magistrate could independently determine whether the informant 
was reliable. There is no indication how recently the informant 
had provided information and whether that information had been 
reliable. The only information the magistrate had before him was 
that sometime in the past, someone was convicted based upon 
information from this informant. There is no indication that the 
informant's prior information had ever been independently 
verified by officers. 
The information supplied about the informant and by the 
informant was insufficient to give the magistrate probable cause 
to believe that evidence would actually be present at Mr. 
Hundley's residence. The affidavit and search warrant were, 
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therefore, defective and the evidence should have been 
suppressed. 
II. THE SEARCH OF THE LOCKED BOX WAS UNREASONABLE AND 
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Defendant further alleges that the search of the locked box 
and the seizure of the evidence which was allegedly located 
therein, was in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions 
and that the evidence should have been suppressed. 
Defendant contends that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the locked box and that any search of that locked box 
would require a separate showing of probable cause and a separate 
search warrant. 
The right to search locked containers has been recently 
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in two cases. In the case of 
U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 
(1977), officers arrested defendants near their automobile which 
had a locked footlocker in the trunk; the automobile, footlocker, 
and defendants were taken into custody. An hour and a half later, 
officers opened the footlocker and found a large quantity of 
marijuana. The Court upheld the suppression of the evidence. The 
Court stated: 
"In this case, important Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests were at stake. By placing personal effects 
inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents 
manifested an expectation that the contents would 
remain free from public examination. No less than one 
who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one 
who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner 
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is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant 
Clause. There being no exigency, it was unreasonable 
for the Government to conduct this search without the 
safeguards a judicial warrant provides." 97 S.Ct. at 
2483. 
In the Chadwick case, the officers could legally search the 
automobile under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. However, the Court held that the valid search could 
not extend to the locked footlocker, even though it was located 
within an enclosure officers could legally search. 
In the present case, defendant placed items into a locked 
box manifesting "an expectation that the contents would remain 
free from public examination." As in Chadwick, the valid search 
of defendant's residence could not extend to a locked box in 
which defendant held an expectation of privacy. A valid search 
clearly cannot extend to a separate locked container. 
"Respondents were therefore entitled to the protection 
of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral 
magistrate, before their privacy interests in the 
contents of the footlocker were invaded." 97 S.Ct. at 
2486. 
Defendant in this case was entitled to have a neutral 
magistrate determine probable cause relating to the locked box 
before his privacy interests in the box were invaded. As in the 
Chadwick case, a valid search does not extend to a locked 
container. 
In the case of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 
2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), police stopped a vehicle and 
searched an unlocked suitcase located in the trunk. The Court in 
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that case held that the valid search could not extend to a 
suitcase located within the vehicle. 
Although the present case does not involve a vehicle and a 
suitcase, it is analogous to Chadwick and Sanders in that it 
involves a locked container, in which a person is manifesting an 
expectation of privacy, which is located during a valid search, 
and which is searched without a search warrant for the locked 
container. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Chadwick and Sanders 
should clearly apply to the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence obtained in this case should have been 
suppressed by the Court. The affidavit for the search warrant was 
defective for two reasons. First, the information contained in 
the affidavit was five days old and there was nothing contained 
in the affidavit which could have given the magistrate probable 
cause to believe that evidence would be at defendant's residence 
at the time the search warrant was issued. 
Second, the affidavit did not contain sufficient facts or 
details from which the magistrate could make a determination that 
the confidential informant was currently a reliable informant. 
The informant's information was so vague in nature that it could 
have been the product of his imagination or rumor, rather than 
personal observation. It was so vague that the informant could 
have been the one selling the marijuana. The only information 
supplied concerning the informant's reliability was that he had 
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supplied information sometime in the past which resulted in 
several convictions. 
Even if the Court holds the search of defendant's residence 
to be a valid search, the scope of the search did not extend to a 
locked box in which the defendant had manifest an expectation of 
privacy. 
The search and seizure were clearly invalid and the evidence 
should have been suppressed by the Court. Defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the decision of the District 
Court and remand the case to the District Court with instructions 
to suppress the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this <^^— day of June, 1986. 
r 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to David L. Wilkinson, 
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this J>^L day of June, 1986. 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
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CIRCUIT COURT, ORIN DKPARTMKHT 
0TAH COUNTY, STATK OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-VS-
DALE HUNDLEY 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF AMD MOTION 




STATE OF UTAH, ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
1. J. Peter Hansen, being first duly sworn on oath, 
depos es and says: 
2. That I am a police officer for the Orem Department 
of Public Safety, Orem, Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. That Dale J. Hundley lives at the address 1097 
North 150 West Orem, Utah County, Utah, 
4. That your affiant describes the address at 1097 
North 150 West as an east-facing brown brick four-plex with the 
numbers 1097 on the door of the upper floor north apartment in 
Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
5. That your affiant has had contact with a confiden-
tial informant who has supplied your affiant with information in 
the past which has resulted in several felony arrests and 
convict ions. 
6. That your affiant was told by this informant that on 
August 11, 1985 the informant visited the residence of Dale 
Hundley and while there saw a large quantity of marijuana which 
as being sold in s m a l l e r q u a n t i t i e s . 
7. That your affiant is familiar with Dale Hundley as 
e has been arrested by officers of the Oreo Department of Public 
afety for controlled substance violations. 
8. That the materials sought by this application for 
earch and seizure warrant are being held in violation of the 
tah Controlled Substance Act and of the Utah Code Annotated and 
re evidence of felonious drug crimes. 
J. Peter Hansen 
AFFIANT 
ubscribed and sworn to before me this day of August, 1985, 
t hrs. 
CIRCUIT COURT MAGISTRATE 
f="ILED 
FOURTH JUtlK I At [ » ; r n . ' ? j »>• 
i385 0CT 18 PH fc 22 
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 9821 
DALE HUNDLEY 
KELLY HANSON, 
DATED October 18, 1985 
Defendant I George E. Ball i f JUDGE 
This matter having come before the court on defendants' joint 
motion to suppress evidence and the court having considered said motion 
now enters its 
R U L I N G 
The motion to suppress is denied. 
The search warrant issued would extend to contents of appro-
priate containers for the substance sought. 
The citations of defendant apply to cases where no search 
warrant was issued. 
Dated this J_ day of October, 1985. 
*L 
BAJ I IFT JUDGE J GEORGE E, 
Copies to: Noall T. Wootton Co. Bldg., Provo, Utah 
Michael D. Esplin P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 
Kent 0. Willis 60 E. 100 S., Provo, Utah 
